China Trade Panel , Center for Strategic and International Studies by Baucus, Max S.
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Max S. Baucus Speeches Archives and Special Collections
4-23-1998
"China Trade Panel", Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Max S. Baucus
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/baucus_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Archives and Special Collections at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Max S. Baucus Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Baucus, Max S., ""China Trade Panel", Center for Strategic and International Studies" (April 23, 1998). Max S. Baucus Speeches. 628.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/baucus_speeches/628
Printing, Graphics & Direct Mail
ONBASE SYSTEM
Indexing Form
Senator * or Department*: BAUCUS
Instructions:
Prepare one form for insertion at the beginning of each record series.
Prepare and insert additional forms at points that you want to index.
For example: atthe beginning of a new folder, briefing book, topic, project, or date sequence.
Record Type*: Speeches & Remarks
MONTH/YEAR of Records*: April-1 998
(Example: JANUARY-2003)
(1) Subject*: Trade
(select subject from controlled vocabulary, if your office has one)
(2) Subject* China Trade Panel - Center for Strategic and International Studies
DOCUMENT DATE*: 04/23/1998
(Example: 01/12/1966)
* "required information"
CLICK TO PRINT
BAUCUS
rdgu I 9
China Trade Panel
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Senator Max Baucus
April 29, 1998
Good afternoon, everyone.
I'm very much interested in hearing what all of you have to
say. Senators spend all too much time hearing themselves talk,
and today I want to listen a bit more. So I'll be brief.
TRADE PROBLEMS
For the past eight years, trade and economics have been the
glue holding relations with China together. During the debates
over MFN status in the early 1990s, the promise of the China
market, and our desire to support China's economic reforms, were
probably the most important factor preventing a major break.
In the past year our overall relationship with China
improved. Some of the gaps on security and human rights issues
narrowed. But while this has happened, trade is in danger of
becoming the weak point in our relationship.
Why is this, and what can we do about it?
To begin with, our economic goals are not so far apart.
China's reformers seek a working market economy for China's
people. We seek a fair and open market. Those two things can go
together. And in some other economic areas -- especially China's
response to the Asian financial crisis -- we work together very
well.
THREE RISKS
But trade is an exception. Our goal has been to open trade
through a good WTO accession, which would open trade to our goods
and services while allowing us to move forward on full
normalization of trade relations, including permanent MFN status.
That is the right goal. But negotiations,.have stalled for.
twoyeas. And if they dont s eed up. as President Clinton "s
ps a proac I. 0ee thre risks -ahead.
1: China Trade as an Economic Issue
First is the economic risk the status quo poses to us.
Our imports, from China and Hong Kong combined, have grown
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from $50 to $72 billion. Our exports, only from $30 to $34
billion. So the deficit has grown to an enormous height.
The reasons are clear. The Agriculture Ministry, whose
policies on wheat and citrus violate our 1992 Market Access
Agreement, fears a backlash from farmers. Industrial ministries
own companies, joint ventures and "pillar industries" which will
get competition from foreign firms. "Red capitalists" might lose
concessions from relatives in the government, and all the rest.
And so on and so forth. It is unfair to Americans. It is only
fair and right that China is as open to us as we are to them.
And the status quo invites a broad campaign against trade with
China.
2. China Trade as a Political Issue
Second is a broader political risk to US-China relations.
As long as our own economy remains strong, trade problems
will be one in a long list of items on our China agenda. But
when our economy turns down, if we are still looking at flat
exports and $40 or $50 billion trade deficits, we should expect a
great deal of anger and fear from the public.
With both parties divided over trade and China policy, that
could make trade with China -- including the WTO accession -- a
divisive issue in the 2000 Presidential campaign. The
consequences of that are hard to predict. But ever since the
1950s and the "who lost China" debate, past, when China policy
has become a political issue, the consequences have usually been
bad.
3: China's Economic Health
And third, the status quo may be a threat to China's
economic health.
At present, in most ways China's economic management looks
good. The economy is growing. Buildings are going up all over
the place. Companies are opening and people are finding
opportunity.
But this is accompanied by warning signs that, in hindsight,
we should have caught in Southeast Asia and Korea. Politically
driven loans to support favored industrial sectors, companies or
individuals. Corruption and nepotism. Property bubbles in big
cities. The proportion of bad debts from state-owned industries
rising while government revenue falls relative to GDP.
To paraphrase Chairman Mao, the East is in the red. And the
status quo is not only bad for us, it is dangerous for China.
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So I think -- for our own economic interest, for the good
relationship both countries need, and for the healthy China we
need to see in the coming decades -- our policies need to be a
little tougher and more focused.
Most of the reforms we hope to see as China enters the WTO
-- not only lower tariffs and quotas, but greater reliance on the
rule of law, fewer subsidies, a more open and market-driven
economy -- are very much like the successful reforms the IMF has
asked from Thailand and Korea.
China's problems are not precisely the same as theirs. It
has fewer foreign debts, more fixed investment, and -- most
important -- an early warning. But they are close enough to
worry me. And it is a happy coincidence that the solutions are
very close to our goals in trade, and to the goals of China's own
economic reforms.
But up to now China has not been able to face up to them.
So I think, in essence, we need a policy of tough love.
China must have a material incentive to enter the WTO. So
the Administration should endorse, and Congress pass, a law to
make permanent MFN status automatic when China enters the WTO.
China must have a moral incentive to enter the WTO. So with
our bilateral talks on Taiwan's WTO membership complete, the
Administration should push for Taiwan's rapid entry into the WTO,
regardless of where talks with China stand.
And China must see a price for unnecessary delay in entering
the WTO. So if we are still stagnating after the President's
visit to China in June, we should open a broad market access case
under Section 301 of our trade law.
CONCLUSION
This is a pretty tough approach. It can be avoided if China
takes a different approach to our trade negotiations as President
Clinton's state visit approaches. But if the status quo doesn't
change, our policies have to recognize that and adapt.
Thank you all. I look forward to your questions -- but more
to hearing your views, opinions and reactions.
